Mineral Rights - Breach of Contract - Damages by Hardy, George W., III
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 2
February 1958
Mineral Rights - Breach of Contract - Damages
George W. Hardy III
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
George W. Hardy III, Mineral Rights - Breach of Contract - Damages, 18 La. L. Rev. (1958)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol18/iss2/13
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that the Gordon case had not required such a foundation. 21 The
federal rule now is that the defendant may compel production
merely by making his demand for specific documents containing
prior statements which touch the testimony of the government
witness. 22 It is interesting to speculate as to whether the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court will further liberalize its views as a result
of the Jencks decision.
Jerre Lloyd
MINERAL RIGHTS - BREACH OF CONTRACT - DAMAGES
Plaintiff landowners executed a mineral lease with defend-
ant's assignors. The lease contained a clause obligating the lessee
to drill offset wells if such were necessary,' and also provided
that the lessor had to put the lessee in default for any alleged
breach of any express or implied obligation of the lease.2 If the
lessee, within sixty days of notice, proceeded to meet the alleged
breaches, he was not to be considered in default. Defendant
drilled a well on the leased tract, completing it in the "D" sand,
the lowest of three productive sands. Subsequently, six wells
were drilled by defendant on surrounding tracts. As a conse-
quence of a geological survey conducted by plaintiffs, it was dis-
closed that one of the adjoining wells was within 660 feet of the
leased tract,8 that the surrounding wells were producing from
the "C" sand which underlay plaintiffs' tract, and that they
were draining minerals underlying the leased tract. Plaintiffs
gave notice of breach, demanding that defendant take steps to
prevent drainage from the "C" sand beneath the leased tract.
Within forty-two days defendant had recompleted the well on
the leased tract in the "C" sand. In a suit to recover damages
for failure to drill an offset well and for drainage from beneath
21. 353 U.S. 657 (1957), noted page 345 supra.
22. Ibid.
1. "In the event a well or wells producing oil in paying quantities should be
brought in on adjacent lands not owned by the Lessor and within six hundred
sixty (660) feet of said land, Lessee agrees to drill such offset wells as a reason-
ably prudent operator would drill under the same or similar circumstances."
2. "In the event Lessor considers that Lessee has not complied with all its
obligations hereunder, both express and implied, Lessor shall notify Lessee in
writing, setting out specifically in what respects Lessee has breached this contract.
If within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice, Lessee shall meet or com-
mence to meet the breaches alleged by Lessor Lessee shall not be deemed in default
hereunder. The service of said notice and the lapse of sixty (60) days without
Lessee meeting or commencing to meet the alleged breaches shall be deemed an
admission or presumption that Lessee has failed to perform all its obligations
hereunder."
3. See note 1 supra.
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the leased tract, plaintiffs alleged breach of certain express and
implied obligations. The district court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, held, affirmed. The appellee's operations on adjoin-
ing leases did not constitute an active breach of contract exoner-
ating plaintiff from the necessity of putting defendant in de-
fault. Further, the complaint stated no cause of action in tort,
as contended by plaintiff. Since defendant had complied with
plaintiffs' sole notice of default, it could not be held in damages.
Billeaud Planters Co. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 245 F.2d 14
(5th Cir. 1957)
In those systems of law springing from the Roman Civil Law,
the recovery of damages for breach of contract is based upon
the notion of fault.4 According to Toullier, an obligor is always
guilty of fault when he has failed to fulfill his obligations with-
out legitimate excuse - without having been impeded from per-
formance by an event which cannot be imputed to him.5 The
problem of fault sufficient to subject a party to liability for
damages resolves itself into the question of when an obligor
may be deemed "in default" in the juridical sense of the word.
A distinction appears to be drawn on the basis of awareness on
the part of the obligor that he has been guilty of fault. Thus,
the separation is made between active and passive breach of
contract.6 If a person violates a contract by doing something
which he is bound not to do, the law presumes knowledge of the
improper nature of such an act, and the right to seek damages
inures to the benefit of the obligee at the moment of breach.7
On the other hand, if a party be bound to do somethingi or to
deliver an object, even though a time be specified for perform-
ance, the law infers that the parties merely intended' that per-
formance be exigible at the will of the obligee. 8 For this reason,
the obligee is required to make a demand of performance upon
his obligor in order to give him notice that he may be held in
damages and thus prevent his being surprised by a demand for
damages when he is ignorant of any fault on his part.9 In the
category of passive breach, however, an exception is made if
time is considered "of the essence" of the contract, or, in other
words, if the obligation may be performed only at a single
4. 3 TouLLI, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIs 402 et 8eq. (1833).
5. Id. at 404.
6. CODE CIviL arts. 1145, 1146; LA. CIviL CODE arts. 1931, 1932 (1870).
7. See note 6 supra.
8. 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 408 (1833).
9. Watson v. Feibel, 139 La. 375, 71 So. 585 (1916) ; Sarpy, The Putting in
Default as a Prerequisite to a Suit in Louisiana, 1 LOYOLA L. REv. 127 (1942).
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moment or period in time.'0 In such a case no putting in default
is required." Pervading all, however, is the notion of fault,
complemented by the idea that a debtor should be aware of his
guilt in order that he be liable for damages.
Louisiana has long recognized the existence in mineral leases
of implied obligations, 2 among which are the obligation to dili-
gently develop a leased tract for the mutual benefit of the par-
ties" and the obligation to protect the lease from drainage by
production from adjoining tracts.14  Today some obligations
which were formerly implied are often included as express con-
ditions of the lease.' 5 The mere omission to perform obligations
of this nature appears to be properly regarded as a passive
breach of contract. Thus, when such obligations, express or im-
plied, are made the basis of a suit for damages, courts have re-
quired that the lessee be placed in default in order that he be
made responsible to the lessor.16
It is presently customary in Louisiana mineral lease forms
to include a clause requiring the lessor to give notice of an
alleged breach of the express or implied obligations of the lease
contract. 7 Usually, the lapse of a specified number of days with-
out corrective action on the part of the lessee is regarded as a
condition precedent to the bringing of any action for damages
based on breach of the lease contract.18 Although the default
10. See note 9 supra; 3 TOULaER, LE DROIT CIVIL FEANCAiS 410 (1833).
11. See note 10 8upra.
12. Thomason v. United Gas Public Service Co., 98 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 632 (1939) ; Roberts v. United Carbon Co., 78 F.2d 39 (5th
Cir. 1935) ; Romero v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 93 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. La.
1950), modified, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Lindow v. Southern Carbon Co.,
5 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. La. 1932) ; Doiron v. Calcasieu Oil Co., 172 La. 553, 134 So.
742 (1931) (dictum) ; Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 701,
64 So. 684 (1914) ; Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924) ; Wier v.
Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So.2d 1 (1955).
13. Thomason v. United Gas Public Service Co., 98 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 632 (1939) ; Roberts v. United Carbon Co., 78 F.2d 39 (5th
Cir. 1935); Romero v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 93 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. La.
1950), modified, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Pro-
ducers' Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1914) Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101
So. 144 (1924) ; Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So.2d 1 (1955).
14. Lindow v. Southern Carbon Co., 5 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. La. 1932) ; Doiron
v. Calcasieu Oil Co., 172 La. 553, 134 So. 742 (1931) (dictum).
15. For example, the obligation to protect from drainage is in part at least
reduced to writing in the offset clause in note 1 aupra. The inclusion of a diligent
development clause, though it may express that obligation in the contract, leaves
for the court the problem of exactly what diligent development may be in a given
case. See OAKES, OIL AND GAS FORMS 25 (1952).
16. Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924) ; Hiller v. Humphreys
Carbon Co., 165 La. 370, 115 So. 623 (1928) ; Walker, Implied Drilling Obliga-
tions in Oil and Gas Leases in Louisiana, 1 LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1941).




clause of the standard lease form is phrased in broad language,
requiring a putting in default for alleged breach of "all its
[lessee's] obligations [under the contract], both express and
implied,"1 9 there is some question as to whether this language
includes both active and passive breaches of contract. Certainly,
if the language were given its broadest meaning, the lessor would
be required to give notice of default for both types of breach.2 0
However, two factors must be considered and weighed against
such a conclusion. First, mineral leases have developed through
the years in response to judicial interpretation and economic
progress.21 Clauses have been added seeking to limit or express
what courts have implied in their interpretations. 22 Thus, it
might be concluded that the default clause presently. included
in the standard contract is a response to the judicial require-
ment that notice is necessary only for recovery of damages for
breach of obligations such as those already discussed.? Second,
the court's language implies that had the plaintiffs proved an
active breach, recovery would have been allowed. 24 Thus, it would
appear that the insertion of the default clause in the standard
lease contract constitutes a reduction to writing of the intent
of the parties as to exactly when the lessee is to become liable
in damages for passive breach of contract alone, whether the
obligation allegedly violated the express or implied.
Louisiana courts have refused to consider as tortious conduct
the drainage by one operator of fugacious minerals from an
adjoining tract.25 Such drainage by adjoining wells has never-
theless given rise to the obligation of the lessee of the unde-
19. See note 2 8upra.
20. This interpretation was given to the broad language of the default clause
by Hunter, J., in the lower court decision of the instant case: "Plaintiffs' first
argument against the effect of Paragraph 12 is based on the assumption that there
was an active violation of the contract, and that the defense is dependent upon
the law found in Louisiana Statutes Annotated - Civil Code Articles 1932 and
1933. However, these articles are not controlling when there is a positive contract
provision to the contrary. They have no application where there is an express
agreement that notice must be given at a specific time and in a specific manner."
Billeaud Planters, ,Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 144 F. Supp. 564, 571 (W.D. La.
1956).
21. For a general discussion of the evolution of the oil, gas, and mineral lease,
see Moses, The Evolution of the Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease, 22 TuL. L. REv. 471
(1948). Compare the 1853 lease set out therein with present lease forms.
22. Moses, The Evolution of the Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease, 22 TUL. L. REV.
471 (1948).
23. See note 16 supra.
24. See note 34 infra.
25. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co. v. White Bros., 157 La. 728, 103 So. 23 (1925);
Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919).
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veloped tract to protect it from depletion. 26 However, Louisiana
courts have not considered the problem posed by the instant
case in which, drainage on one tract of land is caused by the
lessee of both that land and the adjoining tract. Those juris-
dictions which have considered this problem have unanimously
held that in such a situation the lessee is not at liberty to deplete
his lessor's land.2 7 In one recent case,28 the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that although oil normally belongs to the person
reducing it to possession, when a producer is under a duty not
to destroy or deplete the lands of his lessor, he is not free to
impair the value of the undeveloped lease. Further, the court
pointed out that this responsibility is separable from the duty
to drill offset wells and that even though a lessee be absolved
from compliance with that obligation, he is not relieved of re-
sponsibility for substantial drainage by him.
In order to achieve a clear understanding of the instant case,
three factual aspects must be emphasized: first, it was clear
that defendant was in default of his obligation to drill offset
wells; second, defendant had not developed the tract beyond
production from a single well producing from the "D" sand
although it appears unquestionable that production was pos-
sible from other sands; third, the six wells drilled by defendant
on adjoining tracts drained minerals from the "C" sand under-
lying the leased tract. Plaintiffs complained of defendant's
failure to drill offset wells as expressly required by the contract
and also relied on implied covenants (a) to properly develop
the lease; (b) to protect from drainage; (c) to pay for all drain-
age by lessee whether by wells on or off the leased tract. On
appeal, complainants assigned as error the failure of the trial
court to find that it was excused from putting defendants in
default for the reasons that the activities on the adjoining
leases constituted an active breach of contract, or alternatively
26. See note 14 supra
27. Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Ill. 1940) Blair v.
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286, 289 (1921) ; Hartman
Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937) ; Federal Oil
Co. v. Brower, 36 Cal.2d 367, 224 P.2d 4 (1950) ; R. R. Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-
Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App.2d 246, 158 P.2d 754 (1945) ; Hughes v. Bussey-
ville Oil & Gas Co., 180 Ky. 545, 203 S.W. 515 (1918) ; Millette v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So.2d 344 (1950) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette,
221 Miss. 1, 72 So.2d 176 (1954) ; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Haynes
Drilling Co., 180 Okla. 419, 69 P.2d 624 (1937) ; Carper v. United Fuel Co., 78
W.Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916) ; Barnard v. Monongahela Oil & Gas Co., 216 Pa.
362, 65 Atl. 801 (1907) ; Kleppner v. Lemon, 197 Pa. 430, 47 Atl. 353 (1900).
28. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72 So.2d 176 (1954). See
also Milette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So.2d 344 (1950).
[Vol. XVIII
NOTES
that the complaint stated a cause of action in tort.2 9 It appears
that on the basis of prior Louisiana jurisprudence the delictual
claim was properly rejected.80  Further, the court appears to
have correctly characterized as passive the breaches of contract
by defendant in not. drilling offset wells, developing the lease,
and protecting it from drainage.81 On the other hand, it would
appear that the lessee is bound, as in any contract, not to do
anything inconsistent with its obligations to do. 82 Where the
lessee has omitted to accomplish its positive obligations, while
wilfully draining from a productive sand underlying the leased
tract, he is in a rather poor position to contend that the only
fault on his part is passive omission to act. Thus, it is certainly
not illogical to assert that the default of obligations to do,
coupled with the knowing depletion of sands beneath the leased
tract, is an active breach of the lease contract. Nevertheless,
relying on a sole case involving liquidated damages for delay
in performance of a construction contracta8 and a quotation of
Article 1931, the court dismissed this argument in the most
summary manner.8 4 In this it is felt that the court erred. In a
situation in which a third party is producing from adjoining
lands, the lessee may properly be held only to its obligations to
accomplish positive action in development and protection of the
lease. However, where production from the adjoining lands is
fully within control of the lessee, it would appear that drainage
from the undeveloped tract is not merely an omission but ac-
tion inconsistent with the express and implied obligations to
29. Additional assignments of error were made, contending that appellants had
no knowledge of the breach until after the drainage complained of had already
occurred; and that appellee had superior knowledge of the breach and did not act
in good faith in discharging its obligations under the lease. Billeaud Planters v.
Union Oil Co. of California, 245 F.2d 14, 18 (W.D. La. 1957).
30. See note 16 supra.
31. The obligation to drill offset wells was an express obligation of the con-
tract, and therefore notice of default was required under Paragraph 12. The latter
two obligations were implied obligations of the contract, also covered by Paragraph
12. Default would have been required for recovery of damages by reason of alleged
breach of either of those two obligations even if the lease were silent in this regard.
See note 16 supra.
32. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1931, 1932 (1870).
33. Godchaux v. Hyde, 126 La. 187, 52 So. 269 (1910).
34. "The facts, as we have detailed them above, clearly show that appellee's
breach consisted solely of its failure or omission to do that which it had bound
itself to do, i.e., to drill an offset well, and it is the codal law of Louisiana that an
omission or failure to act is not an active, but only a passive breach of contract.
Art. 1931 LSA-Civil Code of 1870; Godchaux v. Hyde, 126 La. 187, 52 So. 269.
And under Article 1933 of the LSA-Civil Code, 'When the breach has been
passive only, damages are due from the time that the debtor has been put in




develop the leased tract. It can hardly be denied that in this
instance the lessee was aware that it was depleting the reserves
underlying the leased tract. Protection from liability could have
been achieved by compliance with the obligations of the lease
contract. It seems inconsistent with civilian ideas of fault as a
basis of recovery to state that the lessee was in need of notice
of its transgression.
The practical effect of this decision is to make it incumbent
on every lessor not only to seek production data concerning wells
on his own land, but to procure the geological information
available concerning surrounding tracts of land on which his
lessee drills. True, such a burden may exist in any similar situa-
tion in which a third party leases the adjoining tract. However,
it may be noted that in such an instance, it is more than likely
that the lessee of the undeveloped tract would be diligent in
operating his lease because drainage by a third party injures
not only his lessor but himself as well. Where, however, the
lessee of the undeveloped tract controls both leases, such is not
the case, and it seems that the imposition of this burden on the
landowner, who is usually in a vastly inferior economic position,
is somewhat unreasonable.
George W. Hardy, III
REAL ACTIONS - THE ACTION TO ESTABLISH TITLE -
BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN NEITHER PARTY
IS IN POSSESSION
Prior to 1908, there were three main real actions' in Louisi-
ana law -the petitory, possessory, and jactitory actions. The
selection of the proper action depended on the rights asserted by
the plaintiff as well as the factual situation. When ownership
was at issue and the individual out of possession was asserting
his ownership rights against the one in possession, the petitory
action lay.2 When possession was at issue, the possessory or
1. Article 4 of the Louisiana Code of Practice defines a real action as "that
which relates to claims made on immovable property, or to the immovable rights
to which they are subjected. The object of this action is the ownership or the
possession of such property; and they are therefore subdivided into petitory and
possessory actions."
Article 41 states: "A real action lies against him who, without having con-
tracted any obligations toward the plaintiff, is nevertheless bound towards him,
as possessor of the immovable property of which that plaintiff claims the owner-
ship or the possession, or on which he claims to exercise some immovable right."
2. "The petitory action is that by which he who has the property of a real
estate, or of a right upon or growing out of it, proceeds against the person having
[Vol. XVIII
